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Availability of U.S. courts to review decision to hold U.S. citizens as enemy combatants-executive power
in war on terror
HAMDI V. RUMSFELD. 124 S.Ct. 2633.
United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2004.
In a fractured decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the detention as enemy combatants
of persons who were "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition part-
ners" in Afghanistan and who "engaged [there] in an armed conflict against the United States,"'
but ruled that U.S. citizens held in the United States were entitled by the U.S. Constitution to
a "meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral deci-
sionmaker."2
The case of Yaser Esam Hamdi arose out of U.S. military activity in Afghanistan following the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Hamdi, a U.S. citi-
zen by birth, was allegedly seized in Afghanistan by members of the Northern Alliance, a group
opposed to the Taliban government of that country and allied with U.S. coalition forces. He was
handed over to the U.S. military and, in January 2002, was transferred to the U.S, naval base
at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. Once authorities realized that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, they moved
him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he was held in solitary confinement and without
access to an attorney. The government deemed Hamdi to be an "enemy combatant"-an action
that was not adjudicated by any tribunal but was instead based solely on executive branch review.
In June 2002, Hamdi's father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia. The petition alleged that Hamdi's detention violated
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Hamdi's attorneys
pressed several additional arguments in their briefs. First, they argued that Hamdi's detention
violated the Non-detention Act, which provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or other-
wise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."4 They argued that this
statute precluded the detention of U.S. citizens by the United States even when the international
law ofwar might otherwise allow such detention.5 In addition, they contended that the interna-
tional law ofwar, including the Geneva Conventions, did not authorize Hamdi's continued deten-
tion since the international armed conflict in Afghanistan had terminated with the installation
of Hamid Karzai as that country's president.6 Finally, they argued in the alternative that Article 5
of Geneva Convention [No. III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva
'Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2645 (2004) [hereinafter Hamdi IV].
2 Id. at 2635.
-'Two previous "next friend" petitions filed by nonrelatives had been dismissed for lack of standing. See Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 600 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi I].
4 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (2000).
5 See, e.g., Brief of the Petitioners/Appellees at 47 (Oct. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi III brief], Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338) [hereinafter Hamdi I11].
6 Hamdi III brief, supra note 5, at 53 (citing presidential proclamations recognizing regime change in Afghanistan).
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Convention)7 required that Hamdi be treated as a prisoner of war until a competent tribunal
determined otherwise.'
Following district court preliminary rulings on the issue of access to counsel9 and the sufficiency
of the government's evidence,' 0 the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld Hamdi's
detention. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Exparte Quiin"-which allowed the trial
by military commission of Nazi soldiers sent to the United States on a mission of sabotage dur-
ing World War II-the plurality concluded that "if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who
was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's present detention of him is
a lawful one."' 2 Citing the need to defer to the president in wartime, the court stated that because
it was "undisputed" that Hamdi was "captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign
country," he was entitled to neither an evidentiary hearing nor access to counsel." In addition,
the court rejected Hamdi's Geneva Convention claims on the ground that the Convention was
not self-executing; rather than explicitly providing a private right of action, the Convention
focused instead on diplomatic remedies for its enforcement."
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision in a plurality opinion by Justice
O'Connor. ' Citing and quoting Ex parte Quirin, and citing treatises and academic articles on
the law of war, the plurality stated that the "capture and detention of lawful combatants and the
capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are
'important incident[s] ofwar.""16 In light of this well-established practice, the plurality concluded,
Congress had "clearly and unmistakably"' 7 authorized the detention of "enemy combatants"
when, in the wake of September 11, 2001, it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) that preceded the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. ' The plurality left for futurejudicial
elaboration the full scope of the category "enemy combatant, ' 'i" ruling only that persons who were
"part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan
and who "engaged in an armed conflict [there] against the United States" could be detained.20
With respect to Hamdi's objection to the "indefinite" nature of his detention, the plurality
agreed that it "is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities," citing the Third Geneva Convention and other treaties .2i The
opinion emphasized, moreover, that "indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is
not authorized., 22 The plurality nevertheless found that detention to prevent combatants from
7 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
8 Hamdi III brief, supra note 5, at 38.
9 The district court's order that Hamdi be granted immediate unrestricted access to counsel was reversed on
interlocutory appeal, and the casewas remanded for further proceedings. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th
Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi II].
1o Hamdi III, supra note 5, at 461.
" 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
12 Hamdi III, supra note 5, at 461 (quoting Hamdi II, supra note 9, at 283).
13 Id. at 473. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with several written dissents. 337 F.3d 335 (4th
Cir. 2003).
14 Hamdi III, supra note 5, at 468.
15 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2635. ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Kennedy and Breyerjoined this opinion.
16 Id. at 2640.
7 Id. at 2641.
'" Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). The AUMF authorized the president to "use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such organizations or persons." Id.
'9 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2642 n.1.
20 Id. at 2639.
21 Id. at 2641. The Court also cited the 1899 Hague Convention [No. II] with Respect to the Laws and Customs
of War on Land,July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, and the 1907 Hague Convention [No. IV] Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
22 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2641.
2004]
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rejoining the battle was authorized so long as "United States troops are still involved in active
combat in Afghanistan."23
The plurality also rejected the government's claim that an "enemy combatant" has no right
to a hearing to contest his status. Applying the due process balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge,24 the plurality weighed Hamdi's "elemental" interest in physical liberty against the
government's "weighty and sensitive" interests in waging war effectively.25 Considering the risk
that Hamdi might be erroneously deprived of his liberty, as well as the costs and benefits of
additional procedural safeguards, the plurality concluded that "a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for
his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker. 26 It also declared that Hamdi "unquestionably has the right to access
to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand. 27 The plurality opined that the pro-
ceedings should be "tailored to alleviate... [the] burden [on] the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict" and that they could involve the admission of hearsay evidence as well as a rebut-
table "presumption in favor of the Government's evidence. 28 The plurality further noted "the
possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized
and properly constituted military tribunal. '2 9 Because the plurality found the Constitution en-
titled Hamdi to the hearing that he sought, it did not address "whether any treaty guarantees him
similar access to a tribunal for a determination of his status."' 0
Justice Souter,joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in part, dissented in part, and concurred
in thejudgment.3" Souter would have found Congress's authorization for use of force following
the September 11 attacks insufficiently specific regarding the detention of U.S. citizens to satisfy
the Non-detention Act. 32 The government had argued that the AUMF necessarily encompassed
the detention of "enemy combatants" since such detentions are customary under the laws of war,
but Souter noted that, insofar as the government was not treating Hamdi in compliance with
the Third Geneva Convention, it was not actually acting in accordance with the laws of war.
33
Souter and Ginsburg would have held that the government had no authority to hold Hamdi as
an "enemy combatant," but in order to create a majority for the Court's holding on due process,
they concurred in the plurality's conclusion that Hamdi was entitled to both access to counsel
and a meaningful hearing.34 They specifically disclaimed, however, the plurality's suggestions
that such hearing might include an evidentiary presumption in favor of the government or that
military tribunals might obviate the need for a court hearing.33
Justice Scalia,joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.36 In Scalia's view, the "very core of liberty"
secured by the Due Process Clause and the writ of habeas corpus is "freedom from indefinite
imprisonment at the will of the Executive. 3 7 He noted that "[w]here the Government accuses
a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal
23 Id. at 2642.
24424 U.S. 319 (1976).
25 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2646-47.
26 Id. at 2648.
27 Id. at 2652. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the government began allowing Hamdi access
to his attorneys on a voluntary basis.
28 Id. at 2649.
29 Id. at 2651.
30 Id. at 2649 n.2.
31 Id. at 2652 (Sourer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in thejudgment).
32 Id. at 2654.
33 Id. at 2658-59.
14 Id. at 2660.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 2661.
[Vol. 98
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court for treason or some other crime.,3 8 Because Congress had not suspended habeas corpus,3 9
Scalia concluded that Hamdi was entitled to be charged with a crime or released.4" Scalia also
noted that even if the detention were consistent with the international law of war, it would not
necessarily follow that "it also complies with the restrictions that the Constitution places on the
American Government's treatment of its own citizens."
4
'
Justice Thomas also dissented.42 Although he concurred with the plurality's conclusion that
Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention (providing the crucial fifth vote necessary for a
majority on that issue), he would have held that Hamdi was not entitled to a hearing; in Thomas's
view, separation of powers demanded deference to the president's wartime decision to detain
Hamdi as an "enemy combatant.,
43
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi-along with its decision to exercisejurisdiction over
the Guantdnamo detainees in Rasul v. Bush4 4-is a sharp and much needed rebuke to the U.S.
government's position that its treatment of detainees in the so-called "war on terrorism" is immune
from judicial oversight. But the Hamdi decision leaves open at least as many questions as it answers,
including: the scope of the definition of "enemy combatant"; how long the government can hold
a detainee before it affords him access to counsel and a hearing; what precisely such hearings
should look like; the degree to which military hearings are sufficient; whether noncitizen detain-
ees are entitled to the same type of hearing as citizen detainees; and how long "enemy combatant"
detainees in the "war on terrorism" may be held. These questions will have to be answered in
the course of future litigation.4 5
The Hamdi decision is also notable for the ways in which it does, and does not, rely on inter-
national law. On its face, Hamdi is a decision about the powers given to the U.S. president by
the U.S. Congress in enacting the AUMF, and about the rights that the U.S. Constitution guar-
antees to U.S. citizens. At the same time, however, it is a decision rendered in the shadow of
international law, and many of the ambiguities in the decision stem at least in part from the
Court's reluctance to grapple directly with the contours of international humanitarian law and
from its failure to articulate clearly the relationship between that body of law and U.S. law,
whether constitutional or statutory. The Court did not engage in a rigorous examination of the
treaties and customary international law applicable to the armed conflict in Afghanistan during
which Hamdi was allegedly captured. Instead, it borrowed concepts from international human-
itarian law-such as the detention of prisoners until the end of hostilities-and incorporated
those concepts into its own interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and statutes passed by the
U.S. Congress. The unfortunate result of the Hamdi decision's ambiguous mingling of domestic
and international law is continuing uncertainty about the scope of the U.S. government's power
to detain individuals in the context of the "war on terrorism."
The Supreme Court's ambivalent reliance on international humanitarian law is evident in
its treatment of the term "enemy combatant." The term "enemy combatant" does not appear in
any statute enacted by the U.S. Congress and is defined nowhere in U.S. law. The Hamdi plurality's
" Id. at 2660-61.
39 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, §9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.")
4o Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2672 n.5.
42 Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2674-75.
44 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); see David L. Sloss, Case Report: Rasul v. Bush, 98 AJIL 788 (2004).45 This clarification will not, however, come in the case of Hamdi himself; at the time of this writing, the gov-
ernment had agreed to release Hamdi, a remarkable turnaround from its previous insistence that national security
demanded that Hamdi be held incommunicado and denied access to counsel and court. See Jerry Markon, U.S.
to Free Hamdi, Send Him Home, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al.
2004)
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recognition of the category thus appears to have been based at least in part on international
humanitarian law. In support of its conclusion that the U.S. Congress had implicitly authorized,
and that the U.S. Constitution permitted, the detention of "enemy combatants," the plurality
relied principally upon the "'universal agreement and practice"' of detaining captured soldiers
referred to by the Supreme Court in Ex pate Quirin" That earlier case explains, in turn, that
this "universal agreement and practice" is part of the "law of war" and that the "law of war" is
a "branch of international law. ' '47 Most of the other sources cited by the Hamdi plurality in this
part of the opinion likewise derive their conclusions from the international law of war.48 And
the Harndi plurality relied even more explicitly upon international humanitarian law when it
stated that it "is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer
than active hostilities," citing the Third Geneva Convention as well as the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions.49
But having extracted from international humanitarian law the concept that "enemy comba-
tants" may be detained until the end of hostilities-and having found that concept sufficiently
powerful to trump the normal presumption under the U.S. Constitution that individuals cannot
be deprived of liberty without criminal trial-the plurality stopped short of attempting to con-
fine the detention of "enemy combatants" to those circumstances sanctioned by international
humanitarian law. The plurality acknowledged that "[t]here is some debate as to the proper scope"
of the term "enemy combatants" and that "the Government has never provided any court with
the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.' 50 But the plurality brushed aside
the question of what, precisely, an "enemy combatant" is or where the definition of that term
might come from, suggesting simply that detention ofTaliban fighters captured in Afghanistan
was allowable and that the "permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower
courts as subsequent cases are presented to them. ' 5' There was no hint in the plurality opinion,
however, as to whether the lower courts should find those bounds in the U.S. Constitution,
international humanitarian law, or some other source. Thus, the status of prisoners detained
by the United States as "enemy combatants" in the broader "war on terrorism," rather than in
Afghanistan, was left ambiguous.52 Similarly, instead of considering when international human-
itarian law requires the release of prisoners of war detained in an international armed conflict, the
Court instead applied a time frame of its own creation-whether U.S. troops "are still involved
in active combat in Afghanistan." 3
Had the Supreme Court grappled with the specifics of international humanitarian law, it would
have been forced to acknowledge that "enemy combatant" is not a term frequently employed
in international humanitarian law-and is certainly not one mentioned in any treaty in this
body of law. Instead, the more salient legal categories in this field include the division in legal
rules applicable to international versus non-international armed conflicts, and the distinction
between privileged belligerents protected in international armed conflict by the Third Geneva
Convention and civilians who, though they may have taken part in hostilities, remain protected
by the Fourth Geneva Convention.54 With closer scrutiny of these relevant legal categories, the
'6 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2640 (plurality op.) (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
47 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-30.
48 For example, this passage of the plurality opinion includes quotations from an article in the International
Review of the Red Cross and from the decision of Nuremberg Military Tribunal as reprinted in theAmericanJournal
of International Law, 41 AJIL 172, 229 (1947)). Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2640; see also In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142,
145-47 (9th Cir. 1946) (relying on the 1929 Geneva Conventions) (cited at id.).
49 Harndi IV, supra note 1, at 2641. For the Hague Conventions, see supra note 21.
50 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2639.
5' Id. at 2642 n. 1.
52 Comments in some of the other opinions rendered at the same time as Handi suggest that the majority of the
Court may view such detentions skeptically. See, e.g., Runisfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2735 n.8 (2004) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).53Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2642.
54 Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287. Though I recognize that the issue remains in dispute, I agree with the position of the
[Vol. 98
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Court might have engaged directly with arguments that the law of war does not provide legal
authority for Hamdi's ongoing detention. He was allegedly captured while fighting in the armed
forces of the Taliban government in an armed conflict between two "High Contracting Parties"
to the Geneva Conventions-the United States and Afghanistan-and therefore was subject at
the time of his capture to the legal regime governing international armed conflicts. 55 Under
the Third Geneva Convention, captured members of the Taliban army were entitled to be treated
as prisoners of war until a competent tribunal determined otherwise. 56 As Justice Souter's
dissent pointed out, the failure to treat Hamdi as a prisoner of war violated the explicit terms
of that treaty. Moreover, any authority for detention provided by the Third Geneva Convention
may possibly have ceased when the U.S.-friendly government of Hamid Karzai took control of
Afghanistan, arguably ending the international armed conflict there. Fighting within the terri-
tory of Afghanistan after the change of governments could potentially be classified by interna-
tional humanitarian law as a non-international armed conflict.57
International humanitarian law provides certain baseline standards for humane treatment
of prisoners in non-international armed conflicts,5 8 but it does not provide any independent
authority for detention of individuals in such conflicts, leaving it up to domestic governments to
enact laws providing such authority. Even if the U.S. Congress, in enacting the AUMF, intended
to authorize implicitly the detention of individuals to the extent customary under the laws of
war, that authority would have ended with the termination of the international armed conflict;
some separate statutory authority for continuing detentions past that point would have been
required. Similarly, international humanitarian law provides no independent authority for deten-
tion of persons captured outside of traditional armed conflict, as has been the case with many
persons detained by the U.S. as part of its broader campaign against terrorism. Although the
U.S. Congress might conceivably authorize such detentions (provided that they were carried
out in a manner that was consistent with domestic constitutional law and the baseline standards
of international humanitarian and human rights law), such detentions could not properly be
based on implied incorporation of the customary laws of war, but instead would need to be based
on positive, explicit, domestic lawmaking.
Instead of confronting international humanitarian law, with all its limitations, the Supreme
Court appears in Hamdi to have embarked on a questionable path toward creating its own, new
constitutional common law of war, ungrounded either in international humanitarian law or in
any specific legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress. It may be that international humanitarian
law should be modified to respond to the changing factual circumstances of contemporary armed
conflict, but the U.S. Supreme Court seems a body particularly ill suited by institutional compe-
tence to be the principal author of this new regime. To be sure, involvement by the courts is
preferable to the unbridled discretion sought by the executive branch of the U.S. government.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that such persons remain covered by the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. See ICRC, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAWAND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CON-
FLICTS 9 (2003), at <http://www.icre.org>.
55 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 7, Art. 2 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties....").
'6 See id., Arts. 4 ("Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of
the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy: (1) Members of the armed forces of a
Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces."), 5
("Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protec-
tion of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.").
Although there remains some dispute aboutwhether individuals sharing the nationality of their captors are pro-
tected persons under the Third Geneva Convention, I take the position that they are.
17 See, e.g., ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions andAnswers (2004) (describing conflict
in Afghanistan afterJune 2002 as a non-international armed conflict), at < http://ww.icrc.org>. My intent here
is not to stake out a definitive position on this issue, but simply to note that it is a relevant question, and one that
the Court might have addressed.
58 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 7, Art. 3 (setting forth standards applicable to an "armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties").
2004]
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But the ambiguous judicial ratification of new legal standards for use in the "war on terrorism"
is inferior to addressing any needed changes to existing legal regimes through the treaty-making
process or, in appropriate circumstances, through domestic legislation (subject, of course, to
subsequent review by the courts for constitutionality and protection of human rights).
On a more encouraging note, the Hamdi plurality was appropriately cautious about extend-
ing legal categories created with traditional armed conflicts in mind to the broader "war on ter-
rorism." The plurality acknowledged that "the national security underpinnings of the 'war on
terror'.., are broad and malleable," 5 and warned that its holding in Hamdi was grounded in
an "understanding [that] is based on longstanding law-of-war principles" and that "[i]f the prac-
tical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed
the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel."6 One may hope that if
we are unfortunate enough to see the scourge of terrorism continue, the U.S. Supreme Court's
understanding of international humanitarian law will increase over time as it becomes more
familiar with this complex, but indispensable, body of law.
JENNY S. MARTINEZ
Stanford Law School
Availability of U.S. courts to detainees at Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base-reach of habeus corpus-
executive power in war on terror
RASULV. BUSH. 124 S.Ct. 2686.
United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2004.
In Rasul v. Bush,' the U.S. Supreme Court entertained claims by aliens imprisoned at the
Guantdsnamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The Court held that the federal habeas corpus statute
"confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the
legality of their detention" at Guantinamo Bay.2 The Court also held that petitioners' status as
aliens held in military custody at Guantfnamo Bay did not preclude the district court from exer-
cising jurisdiction over their non-habeas claims challenging their conditions of confinement.3
Rasul involved two separate cases that were consolidated in the district court. In Al Odah v.
United States, twelve Kuwaiti nationals sought"a declaratoryjudgment and an injunction ordering
that they be informed of any charges against them and requiring that they be permitted to con-
sult with counsel and meet with their families."'4 TheAl Odah plaintiffs dci not seek habeas corpus
relief. Indeed, they expressly "disclaim[ed] any desire to be released from confinement."' In
contrast, the petitioners in Rasul-two British and two Australian citizens 6-- filed their action
59 Hamdi IV, supra note 1, at 2641.
60
Id.
' 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004) [hereinafter Rasul (Supreme Court)].
2 Id. at 2698.
Id. at 2698-99.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Al Odah (circuit court )].
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) [hereinafter Rasul (district court)].
'The original petitioners in Rasul were Shafiq Rasul and Asiflqbal, both citizens of the United Kingdom, and
David Hicks, an Australian citizen. See Rasul (district court), supra note 5, at 57. Later, Mamdouh Habib, an Aus-
tralian citizen, filed a separate habeas petition. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2 n.2, Rasul (Supreme
Court), supra note 1. Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, Rasul and Iqbal, the two UK citizens, were
released from U.S. custody. Rasul (Supreme Court), at 2690 n. 1. The day after the Supreme Court issued its
opinion, the government approved charges against Hicks (and two others) for trial by military commission. See
Dep't of Defense News Release, Military Commission Charges Referred (June 29, 2004). Thus, of the four
petitioners, Habib is the only one who is still being held without charge. Department of Defense news releases
for 2004 are available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004>.
[Vol. 98
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